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TEMPORAL AND SOCIAL SCALES IN PREHISPANIC MESOAMERICA 
Olivier de Montmollin 
Bailey has noted that "past behaviour ••• represents an amalgamation 
and intersection of many different processes operating over different 
time spans .•• " (1983, 166-167). As a general rule, 'internalist' (so-
cial) aooroaches have focused on short-term orocess; this , however, is 
not inevitable , as social phenomena may be shown to have a temporal 
hierarchy (Bailey 1981, 105; 1983, 180-1). In this paper I examine 
various social temporalities, involvinq prehispanic Mesoamerican spatial 
scales, social scales, and both etic and emic time scales (Table 1). 
The theme selected for special attention here is time management at 
household and polity scales. To fully explore this theme both etic and 
emic time scales are considered. 
Time Management~ the Household Scale 
Time Allocation [TA] study is one form of etic analysis that has 
been applied to 'home economics' and time budgets at the household 
scale, Involving fairly short daily, seasonal or yearly time-spans 
(Gross 1984). A prominent Mesoamerican example concerns a Late Forma-
tive shift to ceramic (and other craft) specialisation in Oaxaca, in 
which it is proposed that a change from a single crop (wet season) t.o a 
two-crop (wet and dry season ) irrigation regime caused a re-ordering of 
familial time-budgets, and cost-benefit calculations leading to house-
hold specialisation in either agriculture or crafts (Blanton~~ 
1982, 22-23; 1981, 27; Feinman 1986). 
Conceotual differences exist between 'maximisation' models (Blanton 
and Feinman, above) and 'satisf iser' models (Flannery and Marcus 1976, 
376-377) in analysis of commoner household time management . Maximisa-
tion models, usin~ princioles similar to those of microeconomics, fall 
within a formalist anthrooological economic s (Halpernin 1985). Satisfi-
ser models are more closely constructed from Mesoamerican ethnographic 
studies (eg. informant s tateme nts about Zapotec family farming strate-
gies and views of nature). Accompanying general princioles of risk 
minimisation, an ideological framework stressing an "image of 1 imi ted 
~ood" (Foster 1965) makes satisfiser models more similar to 
substantiv ist anthropological economics (Halpernin 1984). 
Household economic s may be related to a general anthropological 
model -- Sahl ins• Domestic Mode of Product ion [DMP] (1972, eh. 2-3). 
Sahlins uses concepts from rural sociology (Chayanov) to extend the 
temooral dimension of householding into a multi-generation domes tic 
cycl e (Goody 1962). The idea is that time-use deci s ions in a peasant 
(or any DMP) household vary at any given moment according to the 
family's proportion of produ~ers to non-producers, which in turn depends 
(Archaeological Review from Cambridge 6: 1 [1987]) 
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on the stage reached in a demographic and social domestic cycle. While 
potentially interesting, such a socio-temporal factor has not been 
introduced into arguments for Mesoamerica: the domestic cycle is rarely 
taken into account as a potential dynamic affecting development of 
prehisoanic societies. Suitable household scale data have not been 
~ollected or analysed to make the impact of a domestic cycle a practical 
object of study, nor does it seem that such data will ever be very 
accessible. In the Oaxacan example, cited above, conclusions ab~ut 
household behaviour rest primarily on chains of inferences concerning 
surface artefact scatters (mostly pottery), a few agricultural features, 
and site location with reference to resources. None of the bridging 
arguments are grounded in clear archaeological household ~ontexts, such 
as residential structures, middens or workshops, Even rf one accepts 
the interpretation's behaviourist premises, the bridging arguments still 
need work (methodological cri tiques of the Oaxaca analysis abound; an 
acidulous sam9le is appended to Kowalewski and Finsten 1983). 
The DMP model rests on an assumption that the household social 
scale (usually a nuclear or else a small extended family) is the basic 
and irreducible economic managerial unit. In the prehispanic record, 
various lines of archaeological and ethnohistoric evidence suggest that 
sometimes coroorate entities larger than the small extended family 
served as basic units. The celebrated Teotihuacan 'apartment• compounds 
(Millon 1g81, figures 7-4) or the historically described Aztec calpullis 
(Hicks 1986) clearly indicate situations where the individual household 
is subsumed into a larger corporate economic entity. 
The results of TA analysis may be changed if a more inclusive 
building block than the family household is used: time budgeting becomes 
less constrained when there are greater numbers of hands. For example, 
the Oaxacan farmers• problem concerning conflicting demands of a two 
crop system and ceramic production could be more easily resolved in a 
large multi-family organisation. Several more general cons~quen~es flow 
from positing large corporate (vs. small household) econom ic units: the 
potential for economic and demographic failure of individual households 
diminishes within a corporate matrix, changing the survival-planning 
calculus· corporate durability tends to be longer than that of the 
individu~l household; autonomy of individual household decision-making 
is l esse ned by inclusion in a larger corporate entity. Thus a 
relativel y small shift in social sca l e requires substantial rethinking 
of economic time management analyses. 
Variation occurs in relation to social status at the household or 
corporate linea~e scale, with differences becoming evident between time 
calculat ions at commoner and el it e le ve ls. In this discussion, the 
focus will now s hift from economy to politics. 
Anthrooological studies of the domestic cycle have revealed tempo-
r al Iv inter ~st ing political calculations in commoner households. Family 
headship eventuallv devolves to the designated heir, whose support for 
the family head may be interpreted as a n 'investment' with deferred 
reward. Other oresent ~nd future rewards ar e hel d out for non - heirs. 
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In small household regimes, non-heirs fission away from the family to 
establish new families (Goody 1962). Such dynamics are documented for 
Mesoamerican ethnograohic cases (eg. Siverts 1969), while the possibili-
ty of a domestic cycle can sometimes be inferred archaeologically from 
domestic architectural remains , with the precise oolitical strategies 
left unsoecified (de Montmoll in 1985). 
Anthropological studies suggest that succession to family headship 
differs among elite households in several temporally interesting ways. 
1. Elite family size tends to be greater, often reaching corporate 
lineage dimensions. Coroorate elite groups are often more complicated 
in composition, featuring a mix of kin, retainers, and clients. 
2. Elite political stakes are much higher, especially as family 
headship usually entails access to high (apical) political off ice. 
Apical political office tends to be impartible, since fission options 
are only exercised at the cost of destroying political integrity (Goody 
1966). 
3. An important temporal factor is the tendency for corporate 
e lit e groups t~ increase their size through such alliance-building 
practices as polygyny, thereby increasing the potential for intra-group 
competition. Of the several strategies generally used for meeting this 
problem, one has an. interesting cyclical quality -- rotating succession 
in which various eligible lines take turns at holding apical office 
(Goodv 1966). Such rotation figures importantly in succession to high 
nolitical (and ritual) office for Mesoamerica, particularly in the Maya 
zone (Bricker 1981; Edmonson 1979, 1982; Fox and Justeson 1986; Coe 
19fi5; Farriss 1984; Rounds 1982). This relates to the cyclical quality 
of various emic calendrical time s pans (see below). 
4. Another important temporal factor directly relevant to 
Mesoamerica is writing-aided calculation of succession which takes into 
account multiple past or future successions (for turn-taking), stret-
ching over many generations. In contrast, commoner household headship 
succession calculations need not involve kin reckoning beyond one or two 
generations. 
My discussion now focuses on the emic domain. For day to day 
activities of the individual life cycle, a key emic time-scale was the 
Sacred Round (Tzolkin in Maya), one of the calendar's shortest cycles 
(Thompson 1971, 66 - 103). Each of the Tzolkin's 260 days had omens and 
associations, and was used as a divination ins tr ument . Unrelated to 
natural or economic cycles, and in fact overriding any natural, 
political, or demographic periodicities, the Tzolkin provided a frame-
work for evaluating mundane activities. Household economic and 
political planning was thus conducted within a matrix of divination 
practiced by specialist shamans. Such practic e would have introduced 
factors into the Planning process that are not considered within the 
formal maximising or satisf ising strategies assumed in etic TA manage -
ment studies. To achieve the fullest understanding, therefore, et ic TA 
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studies need to be supplemented by approaches which take into account 
emic time concepts which affect planning. 
Time Management tl the Polity Scale 
For prehispanic Mesoamerica, polities are usually equatable with 
small kingdoms rather than megastates or empires. How might 'manage-
ment' differ at the polity versus the household scale? My general 
contention is that the relatively short-term considerations involving 
careful husbanding of resources, associated with commoner households in 
TA studies differs in fundamental ways from 'management' carried out by 
rulers and' their courts at the oolity scale. A successful, long-lived 
Mesoamerican ool i ty was not just a well-run household 'writ large'. 
An opposite view stresses the short and long term adaptive 
imoortance of sound oolity management, invoking a similar husbanding 
logic for oolitical and economic management. This view is associated 
with influential interpretations of complex societies based on infor-
mation theory (for Mesoamerica -- Blanton et al. 1981, 1982; Kowalewski 
and Finsten 1983; Spencer 1982) . Such interpretations stress that 
oolitical rulers must attemot to maximise the cost effectiveness of 
their information processing activities. In effect, 'managerial' inter-
pretations claim universality for specific European forms of political 
administration (a formalist version of political anthropology). 
Evidence in the ethnohistoric sources suggests that managerial 
interoretations of what Mesoamerican rulers thought and did about their 
polities are suspect •. Such judgements are not nearly as effectively 
made using archaeological data because our capacity to interpret the 
archaeolo~ical record does not yet provide a sufficently sharp focus on 
the emics and etics of Mesoamerican politics. Several general proper-
ties--;;r-Mesoamerican polities are relevant to the issue of time 
management. Four of these are enumerated below: 
1. Rulers were seldom involved in close suoervision or management 
of economic production; their role was rather to skim off tribute from 
subject oroducers, and management was done at smaller social scal es 
(Carrasco 1978 ). 
2. There were no fully professional bureaucracies (Weber's 
faceless file shufflers); many state off ice holders were elite indivi -
duals who took oart in a variety of military, religious, and political 
activities, besides managing information (Carmack 1981; Hicks 1986; 
Spores 1967). In this sense, Mesoamerican polities clearly fall into 
Giddens' general class of 'traditional states' (class-divided 
societies), with very low level ~ of administrative activity by the 
governing group. According to his iYsentially substantivist analysis, 
we should not expect to find fully developed bureaucratic organisations 
before the emergence of nation-states in Europe (Giddens 1985). 
3. A political logic for rulership contrasted with and overrode a 
hypothetical economic (management) logic (Bray 1983). Political logic 
l 
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stressed power and oolitical resources in a New World version of a 
Machi ave 11 ian framework (Brumf ie 1 1983; Davies 1973, 1980 ). It was only 
managerial in the minimal sense that 'oolitical resources' had to be 
mobilised to some effect. Lives and economic livelihood of many 
subjects did not need to be husbanded by rulers to achieve their 
political ends . In contrast, management at the (commoner) household 
scale depended much more closely on the preservation of each constituent 
member for survival. 
4. One might be tempted to infer that the animatistic Mesoamerican 
world view, with its deep respect for the spirit of all living and many 
inanimate things (Thompson 1970), carried over to polity management, as 
part of a 'conservation ethos'. However, a closer look at elite belief 
and ritual oractice shows they were charged with maintaining a cosmic 
balance, not through husbanding resources, but through warfare and 
prisoner sacrifice (Boone 1984; Freidel 1986; Conrad and Demarest 1984). 
Even though ritually 'regulated', this could involve destruction of many 
oeoole and considerable quantities of economic wealth. 
Much of the above has been focused on emics -- the attitudes to 
management that shape behaviour. Proponents -ofa managerial ist thesis, 
however, might discount such assertions as 'paleoosychology' and main-
tain that better managed systems would tend to survive longer than 
poorly manac;red ones. Bailey has reviewed a general adaptationist ar-
~ument of this kind: 
Maladaptive or non-adaotive oatterns may 
persist •.• alongside the adaptive ... [which] entails 
a •.• looseness of fit between behavior and environ-
ment, in which factors on either side of the 
relationship may be varying at different rates and 
thus appear to be out of phase over short time spans 
(Bailey 1981, 109). 
One implication that may b e drawn from this is that the 
ethnohistoric evidence on which the anti-managerialist position is bas ed 
lacks utility because it covers a shorter span (300 years) than the very 
long prehistoric archaeological sequence (2500 years). Many 
Mesoamerican polities, however, do not appear to survive longer than the 
several-century time span covered by some Pos tclassic ethnohistoric 
sources. The refore, the ethnohistoric temporal scale is not necessarily 
inaporooriate for study of dynamics at the oolity scale. 
Ethnohistorical sources, in addition, provide some chance (however 
imperfect) of evaluating rulers' managerial or non- managerial interests, 
which can only be inferred indire~tly from purely ar chaeological 
sources. For examole, from an adapt ,, t ionist and managerialist perspec-
tive, it can be argued that when a oolity survived for a long time it 
must indicate that its rulers acted as better managers than those of 
shorter - lived polities. Another form of argument from archaeological 
data is to cite 'unintended consequences': what seems like good 
management 'at the time' (over the short term) appears as bad management 
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over the long term, but at any given time rulers do try to manage 
resources (Blanton tl !!.L. 1981, 1982). Both arguments lack the 
indeoendent means of evaluating orehistoric motivations which are 
afforded bv ethnohistoric sources. As suggested above, such sources 
indicate that Mesoamerican rulers had largely non-managerial interests. 
Even when one sets aside the issue of motivations to focus on behaviour 
ethnohistoric sources challenge the managerialist-adaptationist ar~umeni 
with evidence that cycles of oolity successes and failures oc;urred 
independently of economic (management-related) cycles, due to the play 
of dynastic contention (see below). 
If polity rulers were not interested or engaged in carefully 
managi?g the body politic and its economy, what were they thinking about 
and doing? Two spheres of activity were centrally important. 
1. Rule:s were custodians of relations between their polities and 
the cosmos with reference to maintaining cosmic balance, as suggested above. 
2. Rulers and their higher ranking supporters participated in a 
compleic set of interactions involving a shifting 'balance' between 
available oolitical offices and the numbers of contending individuals 
and groups. Such interactions occurred both within and among polities. 
Problems associated with access to high office were mentioned above. It 
bear~ repea!i~g that ~ime-spans involved in the scheming over succession 
to h1~h ool1t1cal office generally transcend the human life cycle or the 
o:dinary commoner domestic cycle. This is because a long (written) 
history of oast and future successions can enter into elite calcula-
tions. :or access to hi!;'h office, lineal succession, rotation (orderly 
turn tak~ng), and usuroation followed by counter usurpation (disorderly 
tur? t~k~ng)_ are all well documented ethnohistorically . The range of 
var1ab1l1ty 1n Mesoamerican dynastic contention went from disorderly 
'conflict', ~it\ relati~el_Y little agreement on rules, to more orderly 
rule-resoecting compet 1 tion' (the contrast between competition and 
conflict is taken from Lloyd 1968). Central Mexican dynastic oolitics 
usually fell towards the disorderly end of the continuum (Brumfi~l 1983· 
Davies 1973, 1980), as did Hi!l"hland Maya politics (Carmack 1981). Mix~ 
t:c s~ccessi_on politics were more rule-governed, in an alliance -based 
k1nsh~p matrix (Spores 1967). Lowland Maya dynastic politics were also 
relatively orderly, sometimes with reference to kinship rules (Fox and 
Justesen 1986; Fa r riss 1984), sometimes according to calendrical cycles (Farriss 1984; Bricker 1981; Edmonson 1979, 1982). 
Cross-cutting the differences outlined, all Mesoamerican dynastic 
systems . featured shifting emphases on orderly observation of kinship and 
calendr1cal rules or on contingent manipulative action around the rules. 
Furthermore , dynastic affairs were inextricably related to cosmic-calen-
drical affairs, as e.vi~enced in the close relation between usurpations, 
warfare, human sacrifice, and e lite religious service (Freidel 1986; 
Conrad and Demarest 1984; Boone 1984). Cosmic affairs can be inter -
oret ed as orderly 'structure• to be contrasted with more disorderly 
dvnastic 'events•. However the contrast is not absolute. There was a 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
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I 
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degree of instability in cosmic affairs (Conrad and Demarest 1984; 
Davies 1973; Thompson 1970) and a degree of s tabi 1 i ty in dynastic 
affairs (Freidel 1986; Edmonson 1979, 1982; Spores 1967). 
Of particular interest is the relation between calendars and 
political rotation. In cosmic calendrical thought, sacred bearers of 
units of time arrived in turn to rule a moment (Thompson 1971), on the 
terrestial olane, rulers also arrive in turn to rule a term. Some 
Postclassic Maya rotations suggest close calendrical coordination for 
oolitical and ritual office tenure terms (Edmonson 1979, 1982; Coe 
1965). Other Classic Mava oolitical rotations are related to individual 
· life soans of irregular ·length, but also to fairly regular 'rules' for 
rotation amen~ the hereditary lines represented by individuals (Fox and 
Justesen 1986). Unlike Maya examples, Central Mexican and Oaxacan 
ethnohistoric examples do not su~gest rotation as a orinciple, although 
their dynastic systems ooerated within the same general pan-Mesoamerican 
calendrical framework . Much remains to be learned concerning political 
rotation and its relation to calendrics in all parts of Mesoamerica. 
Rather than sober management, heated and occas i anally chaotic 
dynastic contention was a key factor producing political change. Contra 
Braudel, dynastic contention was not just short-term surface froth. It 
was Potentially a basic phenomenon of the long or at least the 'middle' 
term. In relatively conflic-ridden settings such as Central Mexico, 
displaced dynastic lines did not disappear but remained 'lurking in the 
wings' to become involved in succession crises generations later 
(Brumfiel 1983; Davies 1973). In more orderly settings such as Maya 
civilisation, members of different dynastic lines might wait their turn 
according to a kinship rotation logic. One Classic Maya centre has a 
sequence of steady alternation in rulership between two dynastic lines 
lasting from 160 to as long as 300 years (Fox and Justesen 1986, 16). 
In Postclassic Yucatan, primacy rotated among chosen centres for terms 
of 256 years, the len!l"th of a Short Count cycle (Edmonson 1979, 162-163; 
1982, xvi). Such culturally constructed time, projected into the past 
and the future, extends well beyond the short term -- the daily round, 
individual life cycle, and most domestic cycles. In fact, the 256 year 
tenure for Yucatan's Short Count cycle is no briefer than th~ major 
environmental oeriodicities that have been tentatively reconstructed by 
archaeologists for the oost Formative oeriod, such as the 200-300 year 
trends of rainfall variation (Folan et al. 1983). This illustrates the 
point that social temoorality neednot !l~.lU'.! be shorter than 
environmental temporali ty (Bailey 1983, 180- 181). 
Conclusions 
For prehisoanic Mesoamerica time management at the commoner 
household scale differed greatly from management at the elite household 
and pal i ty scales. Elite and polity 'management ' involved much higher 
stakes, looser husbanding of economic resources, and calculations exten-
ding over much greater time spans. The last point can be taken even 
further into the the emic domain by looking at the linkage between 
social scales and calendrical time spans (summarised in Table 1). Elite 
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individuals whose social universe encompassed the polity and beyond, had 
the full calendar (with both short and lon?, time spans) as part of their 
world view. In contrast, commoners, whose social universe was primarily 
the household and the immediate community, used partial versions of the 
same calendar (limited to its relatively shorter time spans) as part of 
a locally rooted world view. At social scales such as the community, it 
is possible that intermediate length calendrical cycles were tied to 
Jocal politics and ritual affecting community leaders (Coe 1965). Over-
all, individuals concerned with events occurring at more encompassing 
soci&l scales were routinely dealing with longer emic (and etic) social 
time spans • 
Mesoamericanist archaeologists need to draw more fully on the work 
of ethnohistorians and epigraphists in order to integrate ~mic time 
structures into their models and analyses. If made to stand alone, etic 
approaches such as TA analysis at the household scale or 'managerial' 
analysis at the polity scale , produce excessively austere results. In a 
combined approach, etic analyses can provide an interesting set of 
abstract benchmarks against which to evaluate the different motivations 
and behaviours sug?,ested by more emically oriented analyses, eg. 
analyses of household scale divination frameworks or of polity scale 
dynastic contention on a cosmic stage. Finally, I hooe to have 
established that etic or emic analysis of temporal issues in prehispanic 
Mesoamerica would benefit from close attention to the effects of social 
scale as well as social stratification. 
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